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DUTY ISSUES IN THE EVER-CHANGING WORLD OF PAYMENTS
PROCESSING: IS IT TIME FOR NEW RULES?
SARAH JANE HUGHES*

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in payments law generally-such as "electronic
check conversion" and Check 21 '-have changed the operational and legal
landscape of payments. Since the last time that all retail payments law was
subjected to a "global" review, in the "Uniform Payments Code" project
roughly twenty-five years ago, so many things have changed that it is time
to think about catching the law up with the marketplace again.
The marketplace in this case is larger and less intermediated than it
was. Payments products, payments systems, and means of committing
payments frauds have proliferated in the past twenty-five years. Check 21,
recent amendments to the scope of Regulation E, 2 and expansion of the
National Automated Clearing House Association Operating Rules
(NACHA Rules) 3 and Electronic Check Clearing House Organization Operating Rules (ECCHO Rules) 4 to cover new products, all signal the types
of product changes we have seen. Payment systems rules have arisen with
the new products. New means of fraud include intentional duplicate pre* University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law, Indiana University School of Law,
Bloomington, Indiana. The author served as the reporter for the Study Committee on the Law of Payment Systems of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws from 2002 to 2004
on The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, and as an advisor to The Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code on the Act's implementation in Regulation CC. The author thanks
Carlisle ("Connie") Ring for access to his archives on the Uniform Payments Code Project, Louise
Roseman, who long ago gave me a copy of the Uniform Payments Code when such copies were scarce
as hens' teeth, and Kevin Dent, Indiana University School of Law Class of 2008, for research assistance. Despite all of this help, all errors remain my own.
1. Check Clearing for the 21st Century (Check 21) Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (Supp. V
2005).
2. Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,437 (Aug. 30, 2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 205).
3. E.g., NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 2007 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE
TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, at R 1-19 (2007) [hereinafter 2007
NACHA RULES].
4. ECCHO Home Page, http://www.eccho.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (select "ECCHO
RULES" hyperlink on the top right part of the page, then request a password to obtain a copy of the
Rules) [hereinafter ECCHO Rules].
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sentments of the same obligation as well as new age alterations and counterfeit instruments.
The marketplace has been adjusting faster than "laws" can. System
rules have changed frequently. 5 Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Articles 3 and 4-those elegantly conceived and drafted backbones of check
collection that have stood for decades-have decreased in importance as
system rules and Federal Reserve System regulations and operating circulars have increasingly occupied the field. 6 Regardless of how dedicated the
law is to preventing and redressing injury, it cannot reform itself fast
enough to keep pace with the imaginations of individuals who are intent on
committing fraud or with the types of errors that may be introduced as
payments move from paper to electronics.
One of the bigger challenges in this era where system rules are forming a larger part of the "law" governing payments is to ensure that payment
system participants fulfill basic duties to the obligors and payees whose
payments they are handling. Those classic duty concepts such as "good
faith" and "ordinary care" from U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 play smaller roles
in the newer system rules. Instead, there is a trend to make brighter lines in
system rules, including, for example, specific rules on eligibility for treatment under certain of the NACHA provisions, 7 or bilateral agreements. In
addition, the obligation that starts with the issuance of a paper check often
becomes subject to NACHA Rules and Regulation E if it is a consumer
transaction 8 or NACHA Rules and Article 4A if it is a commercial transaction.9 This shift of legal regime alters the scope of duties that payments
processors have vis-d-vis the obligor or payee, and does so in a manner that
may be very difficult for consumers and smaller businesses to understand.
Another challenge is reallocating duties among system participants so
that the participants in the best position to prevent loss carry their correct
shares of the costs of prevention and loss. Although this "least-cost-snafu-

5. See, e.g., id. § 2.9.2, at OR 11, § 2.9.3.3, at OR 11.
6. For a more comprehensive discussion of this trend, see Stephanie Heller, An Endangered
Species: The Increasing Irrelevance of Article 4 of the UCC in An Electronics-BasedPayments System,
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (2006).
7. See, e.g., 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.10.1, at OR 11-12.
8. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,430 (Dec. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 205); Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 1638 (Jan. 10, 2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
205).
9. See Fed. Reserve Bank, Operating Circular No. 4: Automated Clearing House Items §§ 1.1,
1.3, 2. l(j)-(k) (May 18, 2003) [hereinafter Operating Circular No. 4], availableat http://www.ffiec.gov
/ffiecinfobase/resources/retail/frb&opscirc.no_4.pdf The term "credit item" is defined in subsections
2.1
0)-(k).

20081

IS IT TIME FOR NEW RULES?

avoider" principle is not new in commercial law, 10 the issue of which players carry the loss-prevention duties has been undergoing changes in the past
decade. In particular, both the new U.C.C. duties for depositary banks taking "remotely created" checks for collection I and the corresponding provisions in Regulation CC 12 suggest even more duties for depositary banks in
loss prevention through exercise of their traditional "gatekeeper" roles.
Moving duties to depositary banks ultimately alters the loss allocations that
have been in place for long periods, such as the doctrine of Price v. Neal,13
a step already taken in the new U.C.C. and Regulation CC "remotely created check" rules.
This article looks at duty issues in check processing: what those duties
have been, how they might be adjusting to new processing methods, how
one demonstrates compliance or noncompliance with duty-related standards, and what barriers prevent some participants in the payment from
benefiting from those duties. In considering whether the new complex of
rules is appropriate to provide obligors and payees with remedies if someone else mishandles the payment, we should consider four organizing principles drawn from former payments law:
1.

Transparency: the obligor should understand how its payment obligation will be processed and, if something goes wrong, how to determine whether entities processing the payment fulfilled whatever
duties they had to the obligor or payee;

2.

Consistency: the choice of collection method by the payee or depositary bank should not disadvantage the issuer;

3.

Privity: the person who is injured by a failure to exercise ordinary
care, good faith, or another duty supplied by one of the sets of rules
should be allowed to recover her loss even in the absence of a preex-

10. For discussion of this principle in this context, see Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares,
Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2006).
11. U.C.C. §§ 3-416, 3-417, 4-207, 4-208 (2005).
12. 12 C.F.R. § 229.34(d) (2007).
13. (1762) 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (K.B.). For more explanation of the rule, see
official comment 3 to U.C.C. section 3-417 ("drawee takes the risk that the drawer's signature is unauthorized unless the person presenting the draft has knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized").
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isting relationship with the person who caused the loss or any other
connection that would normally cause us to recognize a duty;14 and,
Proof.the injured person should get the benefit of a presumption
because she may have difficulty proving who caused the "error" in
processing or payment among many payments intermediaries involved in processing that payment and under the different duties imposed by different payment rules.

4.

This article does not suggest ways to answer all of the questions it
raises. Rather, it uses a few hypothetical cases to showcase the types of
problems that arise under the current complex of laws and rules, particularly those for which there is no clear answer at present. Part I looks briefly
at existing duty standards.1 5 Part II presents the hypothetical cases. Part III
states the case for expanding the duties of depositary banks over Automated Clearing House (ACH) systems processing obligations that started
life as "checks," and for the retention of both the duties of "good faith" and
"ordinary care" from U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 and the bright-line duties of
the NACHA rules. Part IV states some preliminary conclusions.
I.

PAYMENT SYSTEM DUTIES-ARTICLES
RULES

A.

3 AND 4 AND THE NACHA

U.C.C. Article 3, 4 and 4A Duties

1. The U.C.C. Article 3 and 4 Duties of "Ordinary Care" and "Good
Faith" and Comparable Duties in Regulation CC
a.

"OrdinaryCare"

The duty to exercise "ordinary care" has been around since the 1962
version of the U.C.C. However, there was no "ordinary care" definition in

14. See Conder v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 384 F.3d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that drawer had no cause of action against depositary bank for its failure to deposit checks into accounts
bearing names similar to those of the named payee); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951,
955-58 (7th Cir. 1982) (analysis of failure of plaintiff's claim for failure to execute a fund transfer on
time for lack of privity with defendant).
15. This article does not cover timing standards such as the "midnight deadline" rules in Article 4,
U.C.C. sections 4-301 and 4-302.
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the 1962 U.C.C.16 so that the scope of the duty was left to the courts to
flesh out. Beginning with the 1990 version of Articles 3 and 4, the U.C.C.
defined "ordinary care" as follows:
"Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in business means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in
which the person is located, with respect to the business in which the
person is engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for
processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable
commercial standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument
if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general
banking usage not disapproved by [Articles 3 or] 4.17
At the risk of boring the expert readers of this article, the duty of "ordinary care" factors into loss allocation cases governed by Articles 3 and 4
in determining the allocation of loss under the "comparative negligence"
rules in the 1990 version of Articles 3 and 4,18 whether collecting banks
properly handled items in Article 4,19 and in loss allocation in breach of
warranty cases under both articles. 2 0 For example, under the general negligence rule in Article 3, the burden of proving failure to exercise ordinary
care-such as an issuer's or holder's failure to protect the instrument from
alteration or a forgery-is on the person asserting the preclusion (a payor
bank who pays it or a depositary bank who took it for collection or a person
who took it for value). 2 1 If the person asserting the preclusion establishes
the counter-party's failure to exercise ordinary care, then the counter-party
has an opportunity (and carries the burden) to establish that the person as22
serting the preclusion also failed to exercise ordinary care.

16. The 1962 text of section 3-406 (the general "negligence" rule) used the phrase "in accordance
with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business." U.C.C. § 3-406 (1962).
Comment 6 to that section explained, "The section protects parties who act not only in good faith,
(Section 1-201) but also in observance of the reasonable standards of their business. Thus any bank
which takes or pays an altered check which ordinary banking standards would require it to refuse
cannot take advantage of the estoppel (against the issuer or other party]." In addition, the 1962 version
of section 4-406(3) readjusted the allocation from the payor bank's customer back to the bank "if the
customer establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s)." Id. § 4-406(3).
Of course, the concept of the respective duties to prevent risk is much older than the U.C.C. E.g.,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 169 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.., observing that "[t]he
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed").
17. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (2005).
18. Id. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-406(e).
19. Id. §4-202.
20. Id. §§ 3-416, 3-417, 4-207, 4-208.
21. Id. §3-406(c).
22. See id. § 3-406(b).
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Since the effective date of Check 21 and the introduction of "electronic check conversion, '23 it is less likely that the original check will survive as evidence of whether the issuer was sloppy or used pencil or some
other easily alterable method of giving the instruction to pay. In some
cases, it may be possible to see or detect the alteration from the original
check or to detect it on a check image preserved by the payee, depositary
bank, or payor bank. In other cases, it may not. In Part II of this article, I
discuss three decisions in which the ability or inability to detect an alleged
alteration was presented. 24 If the payee or its depositary bank transfers
checks to images and destroys the originals according to system rule or
corporate policy, and the error may have been introduced at that point, the
lack of the original check will make for similar difficulties in allocating
loss. At the moment, the allocation in such cases depends on which federal
25
circuit the aggrieved party is in.
"Ordinary care" is defined only in general terms. 26 So, to understand
what "ordinary care" means requires an analysis of (1) the nature of the
business of the person whose conduct is to be measured with reference to
"ordinary care," (2) the geographic area(s) in which the person does business, (3) what standards of conduct are used in the area(s) in which the
person does business and whether they are "reasonable commercial standards," and (4) whether the person's conduct was commensurate with those
standards. 27 Examples of an issuer's failure to exercise "ordinary care"
include leaving blanks on the check and check-writing practices that "facilitate" alterations such as using pencil or erasable ink, allowing rubber
signature stamps to be used and not guarding them properly, 28 or using a
computerized check-writing machine and not keeping it secured. 2 9 Examples of depositary bank failures to exercise ordinary care include inadequate procedures in opening accounts 30 and the receipt of a very large item
for deposit in a newly-opened account. 3 1 Article 4's references cover the

23. For a worthwhile discussion of "electronic check conversion," see Heller, supra note 6, at
518-20.
24. Infra text accompanying notes 75-92.
25. Compare Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 622-23 (7th Cir.
2006) (destruction of original check no bar to recovery for alleged alteration), with Chevy Chase Bank,
F.S.B. v.Wachovia Bank, N.A., 208 F. App'x 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (destruction of original check
bars recovery, but see Judge Niemeyer's well-reasoned dissent).
26. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1 (citing id. § 3-103(a)(9)).
27. See id. § 3-103(a)(9).
28. Id. § 3-406 cmt. 3 (Case # 1).
29. See Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 400-01,412-14 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 4.
31. Id. § 3-406 cmt. 4.
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collecting bank's responsibility for collection or return 32 and banks' actions
33
in paying a check that is altered or contains a forged drawer's signature.
This article assumes that the law will not move quickly to a system of
strict liability in warranty form such as the NACHA Rules provide, and that
some standard such as "ordinary care" will continue to be relevant in resolving disputed payment transactions when it appears the error occurred
while the instrument was in the hands of the issuer, payee, depositary bank,
or payor bank. Part III presents some issues that any harmonization of the
law of check collection should address.
b.

"Good Faith"

The 1962 version of the U.C.C. defined the term "good faith" from a
strictly subjective standard; behaving in "good faith" required only "honesty in fact" in the transaction-and that generally did not take much. 34 The
1990 version of Articles 3 and 4 added an objective standard of "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" 35 to the definition.
The terms "ordinary care" and "good faith" are not coextensive 36 and
Articles 3 and 4 take pains to invoke the duties they create in different environments. For example, to shift loss back onto an employer under the
comparative negligence rules in the 1990 version of section 3-405, the
party trying to avoid loss-the depositary bank, payor bank, or other taker
32. Id. §4-202.
33. Id. §4-406(d)-(e).
34. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1962). Commentators described the subjective "honesty in fact"
standard as the functional equivalent of the "hear no evil, see no evil, do no evil" trio. See Emma C.
Jordan, Holder in Due Course, in BASIC UCC SKILLS 1988: ARTICLE 3 AND ARTICLE 4, at 51-52 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 462, 1988) (explaining that "this test [allows
an intermediary to] literally 'hear no evil, and see no evil' [by] carefully looking the other way to avoid
obtaining the subjective knowledge that would deprive them of the HIDC status"). But there was no
requirement that someone do something constructively useful to satisfy this standard. Courts did manage to find that some holders did not take instruments in "good faith" and thus were ineligible to be
"holders in due course" because they knew too much about the underlying transaction or they directed
its form. E.g., Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 411-17 (N.J. 1967) (articulating the "close connectedness" standard, under which the more the taker knows about the underlying transaction or controls or
participates in the underlying transaction, the less the taker should be free of the defects that may have
arisen in the underlying transaction); Am. Plan Corp. v. Woods, 240 N.E.2d 886, 887, 889 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1968) (adopting "close connectedness" doctrine in case in which taker had "pervasive knowledge"
of terms of sale). Cf Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 196 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Mass. 1964) (bad
faith cannot be proved simply by showing of taker's knowledge of a pattern of questionable dealing by
payee).
35. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(6) (2005).
36. For a wonderful discussion of "good faith" issues, see SECTION OF BUS. LAW, AM. BAR
ASS'N, WHO PUT THE "GOOD" IN "GOOD FAITH"? (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
library/ann04.shtml (scroll down to "Program: Who Put the Good in Good Faith" and select "Program
Materials" hyperlink).
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for value-must establish first that they took or paid the instrument "in
good faith."'37 If the bank or taker can meet its good faith burden, it shifts
all of the loss back to the employer who hired a defalcating employee. If
the employer (who, for the moment, bears all of the loss caused by the
faithless employee's behavior) wishes to share the loss with the taker for
collection or value or the payor, she needs to show that the taker or payor
"fail[ed] to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument" and
38
that the failure "substantially contribute[d]" to the loss.
To prove that the taker or payor acted in "good faith" in this context,
they must show that (1) they have procedures and policies in place to protect someone (e.g., the issuer or the payee), (2) the procedures are adequate
to protect the interests of their counter-party, and (3) they followed the
procedures and policies in fact. 39 Failure to follow the bank's own established procedures and policies is proof of a lack of good faith. 40 Similarly,
failure to have sufficient procedures and policies in place to protect the
interest of the counter-party is proof of a lack of good faith. Under the 1990
definition, "good faith" inquiries focus on assessments of internal risks
(bank employee and agent problems and systems risks); assessments of
risks posed by customers in connection with opening accounts, deciding
whether to advance funds against uncollected deposits, and determining
which customers to trust to encode or image checks or to truncate checks;
and assessments of risks associated with bank correspondents and their
41
processing agents.
Going forward, in part because of the "good faith" inquiry's pivotal
role in determining eligibility for "holder in due course" status, 42 and in
part because it is necessary if we retain the concept for comparative negligence or other purposes, we need to provide standards for these "good
faith" inquiries that are suitable to the current and future automated processing and check-imaging environments. In contrast to the "ordinary care"
issues discussed above and below in Part III, these "good faith" analyses
require introspection (e.g., what should we do in our bank) as well as some
objective understanding of the duty to the counter-party (e.g., reasonable
37. U.C.C. § 3-405(b).
38 Id.
39. See Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 727 A.2d 335, 343 (Me. 1999).
40. Id. at 344 (depositary bank that failed to place a hold on large deposits that Regulation CC
authorized failed the "objective" prong of Article 3's "good faith" standard of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing).
41. See e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-405. 4-209 (2005). For a case holding the early release of uncollected
funds to a depositor violated the "good faith" requirement, see Me. Family Fed. Credit Union, 727 A.2d
at 344 (citing Regulation CC's deposit availability rules as the underlying basis for its determination).
42. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(a),4-211.
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standards of fair dealing). Part III presents the types of concerns we should
consider in measuring "good faith" in these new environments.
c.

Duties Under Regulation CC

Regulation CC imposes duties to exercise ordinary care and to act in
good faith in complying with its requirements. 4 3 Beyond the duty imposed
by the U.C.C. on the depositary and collecting banks to serve as the agent
of the depositor, Regulation CC extends potential liability of banks in the
collection to "the depositary bank, the depositary bank's customer, the
owner of the check, or another party to the check."' 44 Subpart C ("Collection of Checks") also imposes different damages for failures to exercise
"ordinary care" and to act in "good faith"-with potential consequential
damages available in the latter cases. 45 Somewhat apart from the U.C.C.'s
split of loss allocation between "ordinary care" and "good faith," Subpart C
applies "comparative negligence" standards to the failure to meet the requirements of either test. 46 The express reservation of rights under the
U.C.C. and other law in section 229.38(a) is instructive that the U.C.C. and
Regulation CC should operate in tandem to produce a whole result.
2.

Duties Under U.C.C. Article 4A

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) drafted Article 4A after some large-scale execution errors oc47
curred; the Seventh Circuit's holding in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.
also spurred its approval. Prior to Article 4A, funds transfers had operated
under a combination of system rules, operating circulars, and bilateral contracts that were considered by many to be insufficient for resolving the
types and magnitudes of errors that can arise in wholesale funds transfers.
The prefatory note gives three reasons for Article 4A: (1) existing wire
48
transfer system rules applied to "only limited aspects" of these transfers,
43. 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(a) (2007).
44. Id.
45. Id. This subsection expressly preserves a paying bank's liability to its customer under the
U.C.C. or other law. Id.
46. Id. § 229.38(c). This subsection provides:
If a person, including a bank, fails to exercise ordinary care or act in good faith under this
subpart in indorsing a check (§ 229.35), accepting a returned check or notice of nonpayment
(§§ 229.32(a) and 229.33(c)), or otherwise, the damages incurred by that person under
§ 229.38(a) shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence or bad faith attributable to that person.
47. 673 F.2d 951, 955-60 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. Div. 341,
354-55, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (applying the common law rule that no consequential damages may be
awarded unless the defendant had special notice giving rise to liability for consequential damages)).
48. U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (2005) ("Why is Article 4A needed?").
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(2) the absence of applicable law caused "a great deal of uncertainty, '49
and (3) there was "no consensus about the juridical nature of a wire transfer
and consequently of the rights and obligations that are created. ' 50 Privity
problems also contributed to the difficulty of resolving errors because each
party only had privity with some parties in these often many-stage transfers.
Article 4A is a uniform state law that contains bright-line articulations
of who owes duties to whom (e.g., when a bank "accept[ed] a payment
order" and the consequence of acceptanceSl), and what damages might
flow from breach of a duty that are comparable to those in Articles 3 and 4.
Article 4A uses the same standard for "good faith" as Articles 3 and 4, that
is, "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing." 52 It also relies on use of "commercially reasonable" security procedures and compliance with any written agreement or instructions
53
of the bank's customers.
The most significant differences between the duties in Articles 3 and 4
for check processing and those for funds transfers come in the form of
bright-line standards for errors in funds transfers 54 and the role of contracted-for "security procedures" in the loss allocation for unauthorized
payments, 55 both of which were deemed more suitable in light of the highly
automated nature of funds transfers at the time Article 4A was approved. In
possible future harmonization of the various laws and rules applicable to
aspects of "check collection," these Article 4A standards may be helpful.
B.

Duties Under the NA CHA Rules

Reflecting the direction that may be required as payments are ever
more automated, the NACHA Rules provide bright-line duties and detailed
warranties with indemnification. For purposes of this article, I use only a
limited set of the NACHA Rules. For example, operating rule section 2.7
specifies that an originating depositary financial institution (ODFI) may
initiate "destroyed check entries" if the following conditions are met: the
item must be (1) "eligible"-a term defined in subsection 2.7.2 (this re-

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. art. 4A prefatory note ("Concept of acceptance and effect of acceptance by the beneficiary's bank"), §4A-209.
52. Id. § 1-201(b)(20) (prior to 2001. appearing at § 4A-105(a)(6)).
53. Id. §§ 4A-202(b), 4A-203 cmts. 1, 4.
54. Id. §§ 4A-205, 4A-207, 4A-303, 4A-305.
55. Id. 9§ 4A-201, 4A-202(b)-(c), 4A-203.
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quires that there be an "item" as Article 4 defines that term56), "(2) a negotiable demand draft drawn on or payable through or at an office of a Participating DFI, other than a Federal Reserve Bank or Federal Home Loan
Bank, (3) in an amount less than $2,500," and (4) lost or destroyed or "oth7
erwise unavailable while in transit for presentment to a paying bank. '5
Items ineligible include "items that are rejected during processing by the
ODFL ' 58 Each ODFI initiating a "destroyed check entry"-which the
NACHA Rules refer to as an "XCK" entry-makes seven warranties to
each Receiving Depositary Financial Institution (RDFI), ACH Operator,
59
and Association :
I.
The ODFI has good title to the destroyed check, entitlement to enforce it, or authority to obtain payment on behalf of someone entitled
60
to enforce the item,
1
signatures are genuine, 6
2.
3.
the item to which the destroyed check entry pertains has not been
62
altered,
4.
the item is not subject to defenses or claims in recoupment that can
be asserted against the ODFI, 6 3
5.
the ODFI has no knowledge of insolvency of the maker, acceptor, or
64
drawer of the item,
6.
the destroyed check entry accurately reflects the item, 6 5 and
7.
the ODFI has not presented and will not present the item to which the
66
destroyed check entry pertains or a copy of that item.
The NACHA Rules provide similarly bright-line eligibility standards,
warranties, and indemnification for other cases, including re-presented
check entries (RCKs), 67 accounts receivable entries (ARCs), 6 8 back office

56. Id. § 4-104(a)(9).
57. 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.7, at OR 8.
58. Id.
59. This refers to regional payment associations.
60. 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.7.3.1, at OR 8-9.
61. Id. § 2.7.3.2, at OR 9.
62. Id. § 2.7.3.3, at OR 9.
63. Id. § 2.7.3.4, at OR 9.
64. Id. § 2.7.3.5, at OR 9.
65. Id. § 2.7.3.6, at OR 9.
66. Id. § 2.7.3.7, at OR 9.
67. Id. § 2.8, at OR 9. This section provides for nine warranties, including a correct encoding
warranty for post-issuance encoding and an agreement by the originator that a restrictive endorsement
by it or its agent is void or ineffective upon initiation of the RCK entry. Id. § 2.8.3.8-9, at OR 10.
68. Id. § 2.9, at OR 10.

CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW

[Vol 83:2

conversion entries (BOCs), 69 and Intemet-initiated entries (WEBs), 70
among others. Damages for breach of warranty run to indemnification of
RDFIs, ACH Operators, Associations, and "any other party covered by the

warranty" for "any and all resulting claim, demand, loss, liability, or expense, including attorneys' fees and costs, resulting directly or indirectly
from the breach of these warranties. ' 71 Of course, with broad indemnification potentially at stake, the ODFI has many incentives to act with appropriate attention.
II. HYPOTHETICAL CASES WHERE EXERCISE OF CURRENT DUTIES
MATTERS

This part of the article presents several examples drawn from my
imagination as well as from real transactions. Each is designed to illustrate
different aspects of transactions that test our understanding of what standards should govern, which players should have responsibilities, and which
players should benefit from whatever care standards apply or may apply.
The U.C.C. provides that the item is chargeable against the drawer's account if it is properly payable. 72 However, the U.C.C.'s loss allocation
rules preclude the person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributed to the making of an alteration (or forged signature) from
asserting the alteration by U.C.C. section 3-406(a). The person precluded
(e.g., the drawer) may persuade a court to allocate some of the loss to another person, such as the depositary bank, if the person precluded can show
that the other also failed to exercise ordinary care so that its actions also
substantially contributed to the loss under section 3-406(b). 73 These provisions handle the problem if the error starts with the issuer or payee, and not
as clearly if the issue arose during the encoding process or subsequent
translation of the file to an image or electronic file. Article 4's encoding
warranties handle the encoding errors. 74 If the error is introduced in the
imaging, stripping, or transfer to an electronic file, something beyond what
a layperson would consider "encoding" is the cause of the error.

69. Id.§2.10, atORll.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.§ 2.11, atOR 13.
E.g., id. § 2.9.3.6, at OR 11 (Accounts Receivable Entries).
U.C.C. § 4-401 (2005).
Id. § 3-406(a)-(b).

74. Id. § 4-209.
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A.
"Garden-Variety" Check FraudCases-Destructionor Other Unavailabilityof Valuable Evidence to Determine Whether Someone Took for
Collection or Value in Good Faith and in Observance of OrdinaryCare
Let's look at variations on one fraud hypothetical-something that
might be an alteration per Young v. Grote,75 and another transaction that
might be a "counterfeit" check, such as the check that the parties litigated
in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc. or Chevy Chase Bank,
F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.-both cases in which the obligations at is76
sue were in the six figures.
The classic early decision in Young v. Grote involved a drawer, a
woman who the court had lots of fun mocking on the ground that no fool
would let a woman handle matters such as drawing negotiable instruments,
and who, the court concluded, drew an instrument in so sloppy a fashion as
to facilitate its material alteration. 77 The risk of the alteration fell on the
drawer whose actions made the alteration possible, not on the drawee.
Contemporary alterations can occur at many points in the forward collection process. For example, an employee of the issuer or a payee might
alter the check. Or, an error may be introduced as the check is encoded or
imaged or when it is converted into an electronic file. Assume that the alteration is not readily visible in the image or ascertainable from the electronic file and that the item is processed through an electronic presentment
agreement.
In Foster Bancshares and Chevy Chase Bank, because the "original
checks" in both matters were imaged and destroyed by the payor banks, the
checks were not available to help the district courts determine if the original check was forged or altered. 78 This expert audience knows that U.C.C.
Articles 3 and 4 provide different loss allocations for disputes involving
"altered" and "counterfeit" obligations. For example, payor banks that pay
"altered" items in good faith may assert a breach of the presentment warranty of "no alteration" against the presenting bank or any transferor of the
item. 79 This loss allocation rule places the risk of presenting an altered
check on the presenting bank, which in turn is able to return that loss to the
depositary bank or to another transferee whose actions enabled the altered

75. (1827) 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P.).
76. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 208 F. App'x 232, 233 (4th Cir. 2006);
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 2006).
77. 130 Eng. Rep. at 765.
78. Chevy Chase Bank, 208 F. App'x at 233: FosterBancshares, 457 F.3d at 620.
79. U.C.C. § 4-208(a).
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check to enter the collection stream. 80 In both of these cases, the presenting
bank argued that the payor bank should bear the risk if the check was counterfeit instead of altered, on the basis that payor banks were to bear the risk
of paying "forged checks" while presenting banks bore the risk of "altered
checks." 8'
In Foster Bancshares, the payor bank could not produce the original
check because it destroyed the check after imaging it pursuant to its ordinary internal procedures. 82 Nevertheless, the payor bank still prevailed over
the depositary bank in its breach of presentment warranty action for an
altered check. 83 Judge Posner explained that in the case of a check bearing
a different payee name from that of the original check, Foster Bancshares,
as a depositary bank, was in a better position to detect a change in the name
of a payee than was the payor bank, which generally has no idea who the
payee is.8 4 Judge Posner explained that the depositary bank "might have
reason to suspect that the person who deposited the check with it was not
the intended payee. '85 And, he reasoned, the depositary bank "would be in
as good a position as Wachovia [the payor bank] to spot an alteration on
the check." 86 Finally, he observed, it is a question of whether the court
should assume that forgery or alteration occurred. 87 He concluded that
alteration of the payee's name-the "classic alteration"-should be assumed especially where the presenting bank does no more than "assert the
88
possibility of [forgery/counterfeit]" on its own behalf.

In Chevy Chase Bank, the payor bank failed to carry its burden to
show that the check at issue was altered, in part because the payor bank had
destroyed the check following payment. 89 The court reasoned that the
original check "may have shed light on whether the check was altered" and
whether it "may have contained smudges, erasures, chemical bleach marks,
broken fibers, or other signs of alteration." 90 Judge Niemeyer's spirited
80. See id.
81. Foster Bancshares,457 F.3d at 622 (citing U.C.C. § 3-418(c) & cmt. 1; HENRY J. BAILEY &
RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS § 28.11[1] (2006)); Chevy Chase Bank, 208 F.

App'x at 234 (citing Nat'l Title Ins. Corp. Agency v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 559 S.E.2d 668, 669 (Va.
2002) (holding that a party seeking payment warrants that he has no knowledge that a check is counterfeit)).
82. 457 F.3d at 620.
83. Id. at 620, 623 (citing U.C.C. § 4-208(a)).
84. Id.at 622.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 208 F. App'x 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2006).
90. Id.
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dissent described nine indicia that the check at issue had been altered, including a number of pieces of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. 9 1 These included the identity of the "front-to-back alignment as
other checks in the same batch as the check issued by" the drawer, the difference in the font used in the payee's name from the font on the rest of the
92
check, and the fact that it was consistent with alteration by typewriter.
The Foster Bancshares and Chevy Chase Bank decisions comprise a
cautionary tale for all who litigate: the absence of the original check vastly
complicates the required determination of whether the taker took the check
according to the U.C.C. formula "in good faith" and with "ordinary care,"
particularly where the difference between alterations and counterfeit or
"forged checks" are at issue.
B.

Another Real Life Example of the "Counterfeit" Check or
"Alteration"Problem?

Assume that X, before the effective date of Check 21, bought a cashier's check for $25 at a local bank. X then went to a national office supply
store and bought check stock comparable to that used by the bank for cashiers' checks. 9 3 X scans information from the cashier's check such as the
check number, bank's name and routing number, as well as the issuer's
signature block onto the blank check stock. X uses a specialized machine to
fill in the $159,630.00 amount to be paid-a machine of a type no longer in
regular use by banks to issue bank checks, and also not in regular use in the
area in which the check issued. X also supplies a different payee's name to
the face of the instrument. So far, we have a check that facially is like the
cashier's check actually issued by the drawee bank, but that differs both in
terms of the named payee and in the face amount from the "real" cashier's
check that the payor bank believes may have been the source document for
the check in dispute.
To add some spice to this hypothetical, please assume that
*
the check does not use MICR ink, and
*
the resulting check uses five different typefaces and two different
background styles for the amount in numerals and the signature
block.
91. Id. at 235-36 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Some banks use check stock for official checks that laypersons can buy in retail outlets such as
Staples. In the desktop publishing era, using commercially available check stock strikes me as a lack of
care in the issuance of the instrument, which might qualify under U.C.C. section 3-406 to preclude the
issuer from recovery.
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In other words, the check is highly unusual in its appearance. Its unusual appearance should be obvious to trained bank service employees, and
the dollar amount should call for more than casual care in deciding whether
to advance funds against it. Is the fact that the payor bank's own records
show the issuance of the actual $25 check with the same check number
sufficient for the court to deem this one an "alteration" instead of a "counterfeit"? Or should recovery turn on circumstances surrounding the deposit
and advances against the deposit so that there are several types of "good
faith" and "ordinary care" arguments that disputants might raise?
X deposits the check to an ATM in a nearby town on a Friday after the
bank has closed. Just after his bank opens the following morning, X is able
to obtain as advances against this deposit two cashier's checks and cash
totaling more than $140,000. Assume further that X's account at the depositary bank has been overdrawn multiple times in the past ninety days
and that the overdrafts range up to the high five figures. Under these circumstances, Regulation CC would allow the depositary bank to delay
94
availability under the special anti-fraud provisions in section 229.13.
Failure to take advantage of the delayed availability has been held to be a
95
lack of good faith.
Assume that the depositary bank has not opened the ATM deposit at
the time of the advances to X. In fact, the bank does not open the ATM
deposits until the following Monday morning. Finally, assume that the
depositary bank uses a third-party processor whose automated processing
machine rejects the item more than once (because it lacks MICR ink?) and
that the processing center eventually "strips" the check (that is, adds a
workable MICR line to the check) and forwards it for collection despite its
facial problems.
Now, if the payor bank mistakenly pays this check, who should bear
this loss? Should we allow one outcome if the check is extant and another
if it has been destroyed? In Foster Bancshares, the payor bank destroyed
the check after paying it and before the basis for its later warranty action
arose. 96 What happens if the check is truncated and destroyed by the depositary bank in its normal course of business before anyone states an objection to its payments? Or, should we require the payor banks to seek
different remedies-a breach of presentment warranty action for "altered"

94. 12 C.F.R. § 229.13(b) (Large deposits), 229.13(d) (Repeated overdrafts) (2007). Section
229.13(e) on "[r]easonable cause to doubt collectibility" would not yet apply, because the depositary
bank has not seen the thing. See id. § 229.13(e)(1).
95. See Me. Fed. Family Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 727 A.2d 335, 344 (Me. 1999).
96. 457 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 2006).
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checks and a restitution action under U.C.C. section 3-418 for the "forged
check" mistakenly paid by the payor bank?
C. Depositary Bank Takes for Collection Items Scanned
and Sent by Its Customers
Now consider the case of a depositary bank with a base of depositors
across the country or some depositors with many store locations around the
country. An individual customer is the payee of a check and is not close to
a branch of its bank. The bank provides the customer with the option of
making deposits by scan via a specially protected Internet site. 97 The bank
also promises availability of deposits made by this route in no more than
two days, which makes it likely that collection will be based on the image
and not the actual check.
Assume the depositor skillfully raises the face value of the check that
it then scans and deposits, or that it creates a "counterfeit" check from the
original check. Either way, the depositary bank has no idea what the original check looked like, but it captures and forwards for collection the MICR
information from this deposit. Pursuant to the agreement between the depositary bank and the payor bank, the depositary bank does not forward
either original checks or images of checks to the payor bank. Also assume
that the customer who scans the check does not encode it, so that the depositary bank is the only participant that makes an encoding warranty under
Article 4.98
Here, it seems clear to me that the depositary bank should bear any
loss that ensues. Its actions in allowing its customer to manage the deposit
process in this manner are the primary causes of the loss that someone will
suffer. By allowing scanned items to be transferred to it without a backup
means of checking the original checks, the depositary bank has opened
itself up to a loss, but its better knowledge of its customer and its ability to
protect itself through contract with its customer helps it manage this risk.

97. Fifth Third Bank is introducing a specialty web vault that may facilitate processing under
similar circumstances. Steve Bills, Fifth Third Cash Management Line Expands and Modernizes, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 4, 2007, at 11.
98. See U.C.C. § 4-209(a) (2005) (whoever "encodes information on or with respect to an item
after issue") (emphasis added); cf 12 C.F.R. § 229.34(c)(3) ("Each bank that presents or transfers a
check or returned check warrants to any bank that subsequently handles it that, at the time of presentment or transfer, the information encoded after issue in magnetic ink on the check or returnedcheck is
correct.") (emphasis added). Thus, the U.C.C. and Regulation CC employ different standards; the
Regulation CC standard is narrower in my opinion.
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Other Check ProblemsResultingfrom Electronic Processing

Somewhat different problems may arise because of electronic processing errors. Where applicable, Check 21's "substitute check" warranty 99
imposes strict liability. But Check 21 only comes into play if a bank has (1)
transferred, presented, or returned a "substitute check" and (2) received
"consideration" for the check. 100 This warranty arises regardless of whether
the warranty beneficiary received the substitute check or another paper or
electronic copy of the substitute check or original check. 10 1 The scope of
the warranty reaches only to the substitute check's qualification for "legal
equivalence" with the original check, and to a warranty against "double
02
debits," that is, against paying more than once for the same obligation. 1
E.

Presentmentin Triplicate

A payor bank received three presentments of the same obligation by
electronic means. Assume that (1) there was a paper check at the outset of
the transaction, so that Articles 3 and 4 applied to this transaction, and that
the transaction was eligible for Check 21 treatment, and (2) no "substitute
check" was created by any bank in the forward collection or return route.
(We also should assume that no "positive pay" agreement governed the
account on which this check was drawn.) Check 21's warranty offers no
help to the customer whose obligation has been replicated because of the
10 3
absence of any "substitute check" in the forward collection route.
We also could assume that the depositary bank has a system to detect
duplicates, but that system has failed on the day the triplicates occur, so
that the depositary bank does not suspect that it is forwarding the same
obligation three times. No intermediary bank catches the triplication. 104
Without reaching the question yet of what the payor bank did with the triplicate presentment, should the outcome depend on where the replication
occurred or by what means and intentions it came about? Does it matter if
the payee's equipment mistakenly created three "copies" of the single
payment, or if the payee purposefully created three copies of the single
payment?

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
cates.

12 U.S.C. § 5004 (Supp. V 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
An interesting question arises whether any intermediary would have a duty to catch the tripli-
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We come to the conclusion that two of these replicas should not be
"properly payable" by the payor bank under Article 4's rules. 105 We also
know that one or more depositary banks might have obtained a "security
interest" in each of the replicates so that some banks may make "holder-indue-course" noises about them. 106 Are they holders in due course of separate obligations? Or of no obligation?
This fact pattern raises a host of duty-related questions:
*
Did the depositary bank breach a duty of "ordinary care"? Did it
breach a "good faith" duty?
*
If the depositary bank has equipment designed to catch duplicates, does the failure of that equipment constitute a violation of
its "ordinary care" duty or of its "good faith" duty? Or both? Or
neither? Because this payment started life as a "check" and it is
being processed electronically, the duty of "ordinary care" from
section 3-103(a)(9) requires that the bank not violate its own procedures and that those procedures do not vary unreasonably from
general banking usage not disapproved of by Articles 3 and 4.107
Accordingly, because the bank has equipment to catch problems
such as duplicates, it would seem that it violated its "ordinary
care" duty.
*
Did it act in "good faith"? One can argue that this bank violated
"good faith" as well: it had a system and it violated its own system intended for the protection of someone who is a party to the
payment transaction, e.g., the issuer of the check and other
banks.
*
What if the depositary bank does not have this equipment? To
what extent do depositary banks check the deposits they are receiving electronically for duplicates? Is there any expectation
that banks will check for duplicates? Does the depositary bank
have any duty to "test" the electronic deposit?
*
When does the availability of such equipment, working properly,
become a measure of "ordinary care" or of "good faith"?
Changing the hypothetical slightly, what should be the result if the
payee sends the three replicas to different depositary banks? Here, it is
unlikely that any of the depositary or intermediary banks will catch this
error in the forward collection route, and the payor bank cannot catch it

105. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2005).
106. Id. §§4-210,4-211.
107. Id. § 3-103(a)(9).
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08
until the second iteration is presented for payment to the payor bank.1
Assuming the payee has had accounts with the depositary banks for a
while, has not had problems in those accounts, and that the face values are
in line with previous deposits, it is unlikely that the depositary banks will
question the deposits or place availability holds on them. It also may take
some time before the payee learns it has received more than one payment
for the same obligation.
Changing the hypothetical once more, what if the payee's employee
creates the replicas and sends one to the employer's bank for the employer's account and one each to different depositary banks in which the
employee has opened accounts?
If the payor bank does not recognize the triplicate presentments as
such and pays all three "items," the payor bank's customer has a right to
credit of two of the debits to her account under the ordinary U.C.C. section
4-401 rule, subject to any restriction that section 4-406 places on the
recredit rights. 10 9 How does the liability get assigned between the depositary bank and the payor bank?

F.

No OriginalCheck and No Remotely CreatedDraft

A telemarketer sells widgets to an elderly person. The customer provides sufficient account information to the telemarketer to enable the latter
to process the payment, and the telemarketer or a service provider creates a
file on an X9.37 format and sends the file to the telemarketer's bank for
collection. No one created a paper check or remotely created draft representing this obligation.
What law and what standards of care apply to the handling of this
payment? It cannot be a "check" or an Article 4 "item" because there was
no written obligation. 110 Unless communicated directly to a bank by the
customer, the instruction is not governed by Article 4A. 1 Thus, if one of
108. Of course, we have no idea which iteration is the one, true obligation that should be paid. The
first to arrive? What if it is not the iteration that was deposited into the payee's bank account? In this
case, the doctrine of merger and suspension presents a new problem: if the payee's copy is one of the
dishonored copies, the suspension of the underlying obligation under section 3-310(b)(1) ends and
under section 3-3 10(b)(3) the payee may enforce either the "instrument" or the underlying obligation. In
this scenario, the obligor gets its account at its payor bank debited and also ends up as a defendant in a
suit on the original check (assuming it is extant) or on a photocopy of the original check that does not
qualify as a "substitute check" and create Check 21 warranties against double debits. What rights does
the obligor have? A suit for wrongful dishonor? A right to a recredit of the sum paid to the "wrong"
person?
109. See id. §§ 4-401, 4-406.
110. See id. §§ 3-103(a)(8), (12), 3-104(f), 4-104(a), (c).
111. See id. §4A-lO4cmt. 1.

2008]

IS IT TIME FOR NEW RULES?

the current schemes applies, it must be an ACH transfer subject to the
NACHA Rules and, because it is a consumer transaction, it is an "electronic fund transfer" subject to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)
and Regulation E. 112 Processed as a "Telephone-Initiated Entry" under
NACHA Rule section 2.13 ("Telephone-Initiated Entries," or TELs), the
consumer gets no direct NACHA rights (because.those rights benefit only
RDFIs, ACH Operators, and NACHA 113), but does get the EFTA's error
resolution rights so long as the consumer starts the dispute process within
sixty days after receiving documentation of the transfer under EFTA section 908.114
What if the payment is processed more than once?1 15 Do the error
resolution rules of the EFTA apply? First, one must be certain that the alleged "error" falls within the definition of "errors" in EFTA section 908(f),
which covers both "unauthorized electronic fund transfer[s]" and "incorrect
electronic fund transfer[s]" from the consumer's account.1 16 But the consumer must overcome two obstacles to recovery: she must meet the same
sixty-day limit on notifying her bank, and she must persuade her bank that
the transfers were "unauthorized" or "incorrect," 1 17 which seems likely.
The EFTA timing limitations are stricter than the U.C.C.'s. 118 The proof of
what is "unauthorized" or "incorrect" may be similar to the U.C.C.'s
"properly payable" rule in fact. 119 The consumer has to recognize that the
Article 4 check rules are not directly applicable to these transactions and
112. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1693-1693r (2000); Electronic Fund
Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2007).
113. See 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.13.2.3, at OR 15 (Liability for Breach of Warranty). Section 2.13.2.3 also provides that its indemnification includes claims, etc., based on the ODFI's
failure to comply with these Rules resulting in the RDFI's violation of the EFTA or of Regulation E. Id.
114. EFTA § 908, 15 U.S.C. § 1693f.
115. Allegations of multiple debits for the same payments arise in connection with consumer uses
of credit cards, remotely created drafts, and payments like this authorized by telephone that are not
recorded in paper form. The Federal Trade Commission sought injunctive relief against numerous
vendors offering "free travel" packages to consumers beginning in the 1980s. See, e.g., FTC v. Amy
Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.,
861 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1988); Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc.,: Proposed Consent Agreement with
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 57 Fed. Reg. 55,534, 55,537 (Nov. 25, 1992) (citing related 1987
filing against Credit Card Travel Services, Inc., doing business as BankCard Travel Club). Further, the
Department of Justice is prosecuting a payments processor who is alleged to handle remotely created
drafts on behalf of telemarketers. For opinions in the companion civil action, see United States v.
Payment Processing Ctr., LLC, 461 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D. Pa. 2006), and United States v. Payment
Processing Ctr., LLC, No. 06-0725, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75715 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2006).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(f).
117. See id.
118. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a), with U.C.C. §§ 4-401, 4-406(f) (2005) (imposing a one year
notice requirement for most cases of alterations and forged checks in addition to the U.C.C. statute of
limitations).
119. U.C.C. § 4-401(a).
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that the NACHA Rules and EFTA are; further, she must realize that she
may lose her right to her remedy if she chooses Article 4's rules over the
EFTA's rules.
III. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
A.

OrganizingPrinciples

Earlier in this article, I presented four basic principles of payments
law that we need to consider in framing rules for the present and future
"check" processing disputes. These included: transparency, consistency,
privity/eligibility for relief, and proof. They favor a staunch combination of
harmonization and education.
1.

Transparency: Obligors should be informed of how their payment
obligations will be processed. If something goes wrong under the
current mix of rules, consumers must be prepared to invest a great
deal of energy trying to determine what standards of care those processing the payment should have followed, as well as whether someone breached those standards during the processing, and the
procedures for obtaining redress. We also have multiple sources of
"law" for different stages of the same transaction, a factor that can
overwhelm the average consumer. To complicate the task of identifying the standards and securing their benefits, we are in an environment in which system rules such as those from the Electronic Check
Clearing House Organization (ECCHO) and NACHA, which are not
readily available to obligors/issuers, are replacing more widely available sets of rules such as the Uniform Commercial Code and Federal
Reserve Board regulations. To add to this complexity, we also have
embedded "security procedures" that are confidential out of necessity, such as those referenced in Rule 4.0 ("Security Procedures") in
Federal Reserve Bank Operating Circular Number 4 ("Automated
120
Clearing House Items").

2.

Consistency: One payment may be processed by different intermediaries using different rules (from U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 to Check 21
or to the NACHA rules and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 121) un-

120. Operating Circular No. 4, supra note 9, § 4.0.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r.
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der which different standards and different warranties govern the duties of the different intermediaries. The reversibility rules in these
sets of rules differ considerably; remedies depend on following special timing rules, etc. Choice of the collection method by the payee or
depositary bank should not disadvantage the issuer.
3.

Privity: The person who is injured by a failure to exercise ordinary
care or good faith or another duty supplied by one of the sets of rules
may not have any preexisting relationship with the person who
caused the loss or any other connection that would normally cause us
to recognize a duty. Courts have refused to grant remedies in these
cases under the U.C.C.122 The NACHA Rules are specific about
which participants may benefit from NACHA warranties. 123 And,

4.

Proof. the issuer of the check may have difficulty proving who
caused the "error" in processing or payment among many payments
intermediaries involved in processing that payment, and under the
different duties imposed by different payment rules.

We also have to deal with the growing reality of "electronic checks"
(instructions that are never in paper form) and "Internet-Initiated Entries"
under the NACHA Rules. Consumers are unlikely to appreciate that these
are different payment processing regimes. These payments are governed in
the former case by whatever "agreement" is in place and in the latter by the
NACHA Rules and the EFTA for consumer transactions. 124 Consumers
could choose the "wrong" remedy-and be left without a remedy if they
fail to follow rules for the "right" legal regime.

122. See Conder v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 384 F.3d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming
district court holding that drawer had no cause of action under U.C.C. section 3-420(a) for conversion
against depositary bank for its failure to deposit checks into accounts bearing names similar to those of
the named payee, and affirming dismissal of drawer's claim in general negligence against depositary
bank); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-58 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding plaintiff's claim
against defendant for failure to execute a wire transfer on time failed for lack of privity with defendant).
123. E.g., 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.11.2.6, at OR 13.
124. Seeid. §2.11,atOR13.
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FutureRules

Future "Ordinary Care" Rules

If we reformed the law to cover electronic imaging and processing in
one more global law, we would need to provide standards to hold the place
of "ordinary care." The types of questions we would need to answer in
fashioning those standards would include:
*
Will one baseline standard suffice for handling of payments in
retail payments (checks) that will travel to the payor bank by legally divergent forms and routes? Should there be separate baselines for different processing routes? What are the costs of
having different baselines? Are these costs different in terms of
the four organizing principles mentioned above-transparency,
consistency, privity, and proof?
*
How will depositary banks deal with depositors that truncate
checks on their premises and send information to their depositary
banks for collection? Will evolving legal standards follow the
approaches in Article 4 for encoding warranties and Check 21 so
that the rules place all of the burdens inside the banking system?
Or, will the standard allocate some of the loss to the truncators?
*
What will depositary banks do to prevent the replication of information so that only one instruction to pay is sent forward for
collection? To the extent that they use software to detect duplicates, will that software be governed by the ordinary care standard? Will a warranty such as the "no-double-debit" warranty in
Check 21 resolve this issue?
*
In transactions not subject to the NACHA Rules, when and under
what circumstances will depositary banks destroy original
checks? Will the NACHA rules on destruction become the standard?
*
When will depositary banks allow their depositors to destroy
original checks? And to what extent should destruction rules depend on the method (electronic presentment of checks under section 4-110 agreements, ACH, or electronic check conversion)
used to collect the particular obligation?
*
To what extent will payment systems compete to make their rules
available and favorable to consumers? To what extent will persons be hindered in obtaining recourse by difficulty in obtaining
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information about the scope of care in cases governed by proprietary system rules (as the ECCHO rules have been until recently)?
2.

Future "Good Faith" Rules

Questions pertaining to "good faith" that we might try to resolve in the
new payments environment include:
*
Should the standard of "good faith" depend on the degree of
automation involved? In other words, does the standard of "good
faith" differ if processing is automated after the payment arrives
at the payee? 125 Should we expect takers for value, collecting
banks, or payor banks to adopt special procedures to protect issuers and owners in highly automated environments? Or should we
impose new warranty obligations on those who do not adopt procedures when subsequent losses occur?
*
What processing procedures should be instituted if the payment
fails to pass muster under the automated process? 126
*
Should payments that fail the automated processing equipment
12 7
be eligible for stripping and later automated processing?
*
Should we increase the warranties made to the payor bank and
the drawer if the depositary bank strips a check?
*
Should the processing standards depend on the face value of the
instrument (higher standards for larger-value obligations, such as
the exposure-limit rules in the NACHA Rules 128) or the nature of
the payment (low-value consumer payment generated from desktop publishing versus a higher-value item that lacks MICR ink
and purports to be a cashier's check)?
*
Under what situations should the payment obligation be required
to pass some human scrutiny at the depositary bank before forwarding to the payor bank for payment?

125. NACHA Rules require that in "electronic check conversion" the source document be read by a
specialized reader rather than having the account information keyed in manually. E.g., id. § 2.9.2, at OR
11 (applying to "Accounts Receivable Entries"), § 2.10.2, at OR 12 (applying to "Back Office Conversion Entries"). Other eligibility rules apply in both cases. Id. § 2.9.1, at OR 10, § 2.10.1, at OR 11.
126. NACHA Rule subsection 2.7.2 renders ineligible for "destroyed check entries" items rejected
during processing by the Originating Depositary Financial Institution, i.e., checks that do not pass
muster in the check reader. This would resolve cases in which processors might strip a check that
lacked MICR ink and, for that reason, could not be processed through the ordinary reader, then later
turns out to be a counterfeit check.
127. See id.
128. Id. at pt. 1,Quick Find 9 (explaining ODFI exposure limits).
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Under what situations (e.g., when an item is rejected by processing equipment once or more than once) should manual review
(not a traditional signature comparison) be performed at the
payor bank before payment?
C.

To Whom Do Banks Owe Duties?

One of the recent problems in check processing is related to privity.
Evra and Conder put some remedy possibilities off the table because of a
lack of privity.129 But in other cases, the rules are written to provide more
potential beneficiaries with rights. Check 21's warranty provision is such a
rule, 130 even if the circumstances under which the warranty applies are
relatively limited. Article 4A also imposes on the originating and intermediary banks duties that flow back to the originator of the funds transfer. 13'
As described above, the NACHA Rules also impose bright-line standards through eligibility provisions and related warranties. If an item was
converted through a Back Office Conversion Entry (BOC), the NACHA
Rules render ineligible as a source document any check that, among other
things, was not encoded in magnetic ink, is for amounts greater than
$25,000, is a third-party check, or is a demand draft that does not contain
the signature of the Receiver. 132 Participants who process ineligible documents are vulnerable to warranty liability. 133
The future solution seems to require an amalgam of rules using the
current U.C.C. "good faith" and "ordinary care" standards, and the
brighter-line rules of Articles 4A, NACHA, and Check 21. Retention of the
U.C.C. standards will assist in the resolution of disputes between issuers,
payees, and depositary and payor banks so long as the U.C.C. standards
continue to have substance. The likelihood is that bright-line standards in
rule sets such as the NACHA Rules will define the future scope of the
"good faith" and "ordinary care" duties that should be retained to assist in
the resolution of disputes. 134

129. See Conder v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 384 F.3d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2004); Evra Corp.
v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-58 (7th Cir. 1982).
130. 12 U.S.C. § 5004 (Supp. V 2005).
131. U.C.C. art- 4A prefatory note ("Bank error in funds transfers"), §§ 4A-207, 4A-302, 4A-303,
4A-305 (2005).
132. 2007 NACHA RULES, supra note 3, § 2.10.1, at OR 11-12. A "Receiver" is a "natural person
or an organization that has authorized an Originator to initiate an ACH entry to the Receiver's account
with" the Receiving Depositary Financial Institution (RDFI). Id. pt. 1,at ACH Primer 2.
133. Id. § 2.10.3, at OR 12.
134. E.g., id. § 2.10.1, at OR 11-12 para. 2 (rendering ineligible for BOC entries "checks or sharedrafts that have not been encoded in magnetic ink," which would have placed more duties to check the
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CONCLUSION

The duties formerly assigned to depositary, intermediary, and payor
banks are undergoing stresses because of basic automated processing, the
post-Check 21 surge in electronic processing, and the rise in ACH transfers. The ability of parties that are not themselves depositary institutions or
higher-level system participants to locate the sources of errors in check
processing, and to understand which rules actually govern their transactions, is decreasing. Multiple routes for the collection of payments starting
life in the same form contribute to a decline in transparency and an increase
in the burden on the average consumer or small business to obtain remedies. The lack of privity between the issuer or owner of the check and the
person who caused the problem also may be a factor preventing a remedy
for the issuer or owner.
Because paper checks-formerly single, unique embodiments of payment obligations-have been transformed into images or streams of electronic information, with the originals often destroyed before the theft or
error is discovered, the loss of physical evidence for participants in disputes
about payments will be an increasing problem. Thus, paper stock, ink quality, handwriting, handwriting/implement pressure, fingerprints, endorsements (hand- or spray-applied), chemical washing, fiber disruption, and the
like will continue to decline as means to help assign liability based on the
statutory "ordinary care" and "good faith" tests. In this new era, it may be
harder to predict results and to create systems to prevent losses than has
been possible in the more than forty years since the U.C.C. first went into
effect.
To continue with the careful allocation of risks that has characterized
loss allocation under the U.C.C. and to handle new issues that inevitably
will arise as technology continues to change, new parameters for duties in
payments processing are required. This may mean creating standards more
on the order of Article 4A's "security procedures" or brighter-line new
warranties such as the Check 21 or NACHA warranties, or it may involve
an entirely new solution.
Check processing has moved from a one-option, move-the-paperfrom-the-payee-to-depositary-bank-to-the-payor-bank
world, with the
original check as the best evidence, to one in which several viable options
exist for getting the drawer's order to pay to the payor bank and in which
the check may have been destroyed. Check processing options include
six-figure "item" deposited into the ATM and taken for value by the depositary bank before it was ever
subjected to mechanical or manual inspection in the hypothetical case above).
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electronic presentment using the provisions of Article 4 and system rules
and check conversion under the NACHA Rules (together with Regulation
E if the drawer was a consumer). In addition, the proliferation of check
processing options means the payee or its agent or bank-rather than the
drawer/obligor--chooses the type of processing the payment obligation
will receive. This choice, to a great extent, also determines the duty standards, if any, to which the check processing will be subject.
This range of choice is not all bad news: the NACHA Rules and Regulation E provide different, but not weaker, protections to consumer drawers
than the scheme that the Uniform Commercial Code gave them. The lack of
drawers' control over how a check gets collected complicates their ability
to get relief in payment disputes and creates new discovery problems. The
issue is how drawers and others determine whether participants in the
check collection process have fulfilled the duties assigned to them, as Foster Bancshares and Chevy Chase Bank demonstrate. 135 Proving fulfillment
or non-fulfillment under these circumstances introduces new costs to payments participants.
It is costly to leave the resolution of these important liability issues to
litigants, as Judge Posner observed in FosterBancshares.136 The additional
standard-setting and risk reallocation work should be accomplished by
someone-whether by NCCUSL and state legislatures, by Congress or the
Board of Governors, or by payments systems such as NACHA and
ECCHO.
Finally, because the issuer no longer controls the choice of collection
method, it may be time to have uniform rules across all retail payments
methods by which we measure compliance with duties. With larger numbers of consumer checks being processed under the NACHA Rules and
Regulation E, consumers may not object to convergence of the "reversibility" or error-resolution rules as vigorously as they did when the Uniform
Payments Code (UPC) was proposed in the 1980s, when consumer concerns defeated its adoption by the states. 137 On the other hand, consumers
may be satisfied with the shift from standards in U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 to
the NACHA Rules and Regulation E substitutes, in a manner similar to the

135. See Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 208 F. App'x 232, 234-35 (4th Cir.
2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2006).
136. See id. at 623. Judge Posner was referring to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the organization that partners with the American Law Institute in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code.
137. See Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 BUs. LAW. 1007, 1008 (1986);
Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. LAW. 1215, 1220 (1984).
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compromise rules that the New Payments Code suggested a quarter century
38
ago.1
Creating new rules with greater transparency, consistency, and cleaner
evidentiary standards will not be an easy task. In early 2003, when I proposed a more global, UPC-like solution for Check 21's original draft to
Professor Fred Miller, then President of NCCUSL, his response was the
functional equivalent of "are you insane?" And the responses of the states
and others to the proposals in the UPC and to more recent revisions of the
U.C.C. 13 9 suggest that stakeholders other than consumers will have to be
persuaded of the merit of the proposals. Given the costs of uncertainty and
demands of the law reform process, the harmonization process may be
easier than it was previously and it should start now.

138. See Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 405, 409 n.6 (1991).
139. No state has enacted the 2003 revisions to U.C.C. Article 2. See Uniform Law Commissioners,
A Few Facts About the ... Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc22AO3.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). Only Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, and Texas have enacted the 2002 revisions to Articles 3 and 4; Oklahoma
introduced but did not enact them in 2007. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About
the... Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfact
sheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca3.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).

